🔐 @gotgenes/pi-permission-system

Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent that provides centralized, deterministic permission gates for tool, bash, MCP, skill, and special operations.

Fork notice: This package is a friendly fork of MasuRii/pi-permission-system, published to npm as @gotgenes/pi-permission-system. This fork diverges from upstream in config layout (#10). The /permission-system slash command name is preserved; the config and log paths are not.

Features

• Tool Filtering — Hides disallowed tools from the agent before it starts (reduces "try another tool" behavior)
• System Prompt Sanitization — Removes denied tool entries from the Available tools: system prompt section so the agent only sees tools it can actually call
• Runtime Enforcement — Blocks/asks/allows at tool call time with UI confirmation dialogs and readable approval summaries
• Bash Command Control — Wildcard pattern matching for granular bash command permissions
• MCP Access Control — Server and tool-level permissions for MCP operations
• Skill Protection — Controls which skills can be loaded or read from disk, including multi-block prompt sanitization
• Per-Agent Overrides — Agent-specific permission policies via YAML frontmatter
• Subagent Permission Forwarding — Forwards ask confirmations from non-UI subagents back to the main interactive session
• File-Based Review Logging — Writes permission request/denial review entries to a file by default for later auditing
• Optional Debug Logging — Keeps verbose extension diagnostics in a separate file when enabled in config.json
• JSON Schema Validation — Full schema for editor autocomplete and config validation
• External Directory Guard — Enforces special.external_directory for path-bearing file tools and bash commands that reference paths outside the active working directory

Installation

npm package

pi install npm:pi-permission-system

Local extension folder

Place this folder in one of the following locations:

Scope	Path
Global default	~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system (respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
Project	.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system

Pi auto-discovers extensions in these paths.

Tip: All ~/.pi/agent paths shown in this document are defaults. If the PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR environment variable is set, pi uses that directory instead. The extension automatically follows pi's getAgentDir() helper, so global policy files, per-agent overrides, session directories, and extension installation paths all resolve under the configured agent directory.

Usage

Quick Start

1. Create the global config file (default: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):

{
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "ask",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask"
  },
  "tools": {
    "read": "allow",
    "write": "deny"
  }
}

1. Start Pi — the extension automatically loads and enforces your policy.

Permission States

All permissions use one of three states:

State	Behavior
allow	Permits the action silently
deny	Blocks the action with an error message
ask	Prompts the user for confirmation via UI

Pi Integration Hooks

The extension integrates via Pi's lifecycle hooks:

Hook	Behavior
before_agent_start	Filters active tools, removes denied tool entries from the system prompt, and hides denied skills
tool_call	Enforces permissions for every tool invocation
input	Intercepts /skill:<name> requests and enforces skill policy

Additional behaviors:

• Unknown/unregistered tools are blocked before permission checks (prevents bypass attempts)
• The Available tools: system prompt section is rewritten to match the filtered active tool set
• Extension-provided tools like task, mcp, and third-party tools are handled by exact registered name instead of private built-in hardcodes
• When a subagent hits an ask permission without direct UI access, the request can be forwarded to the main interactive session for confirmation
• Generic extension-tool approval prompts include a bounded input preview; built-in file tools use concise human-readable summaries instead of raw multiline JSON
• Permission review logs include bounded toolInputPreview values for non-bash/non-MCP tool calls so approvals can be audited without writing raw full payloads
• Path-bearing file tools (read, write, edit, find, grep, ls) evaluate special.external_directory before their normal tool permission when an explicit path points outside ctx.cwd
• Bash commands are scanned for path tokens (absolute, ~/, or ..-relative) that resolve outside ctx.cwd; matching commands trigger the same special.external_directory gate before the normal bash pattern check

Configuration

Config File

Location: one unified config file per scope, following the pi-autoformat convention:

Scope	Path
Global	~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json (respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
Project	<cwd>/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json

Project config overrides global config; per-agent frontmatter overrides both. Object-shaped fields (defaultPolicy, tools, bash, mcp, skills, special) use shallow-merge (later source wins per-key). Scalar fields (debugLog, permissionReviewLog, yoloMode) use simple replacement.

The config file combines runtime knobs and permission policy in one object:

{
  "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/gotgenes/pi-permission-system/main/schemas/permissions.schema.json",

  // Runtime knobs
  "debugLog": false,
  "permissionReviewLog": true,
  "yoloMode": false,

  // Policy
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "ask",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask"
  },
  "tools": { "read": "allow", "write": "deny" },
  "bash": { "git status": "allow", "git *": "ask" },
  "mcp": { "mcp_status": "allow" },
  "skills": { "*": "ask" },
  "special": { "doom_loop": "deny", "external_directory": "ask" }
}

Runtime knobs

Key	Default	Description
debugLog	false	Enables verbose diagnostic logging to logs/pi-permission-system-debug.jsonl
permissionReviewLog	true	Enables the permission request/denial review log at logs/pi-permission-system-permission-review.jsonl
yoloMode	false	Auto-approves ask results instead of prompting when yolo mode is enabled

Both logs write to ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs/. No debug output is printed to the terminal.

Policy sections

The config file is a JSON object with these policy sections:

Section	Description
defaultPolicy	Fallback permissions per category
tools	Exact-name tool permissions for registered tools
bash	Command pattern permissions
mcp	MCP server/tool permissions for calls routed through a registered mcp tool
skills	Skill name pattern permissions
special	Reserved permission checks such as external directory access

Note: Trailing commas are not supported. If parsing fails, the extension falls back to ask for all categories.

Global Per-Agent Overrides

Override global permissions for specific agents via YAML frontmatter in the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/<agent>.md, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):

---
name: my-agent
permission:
  tools:
    read: allow
    write: deny
    mcp: allow
  bash:
    git status: allow
    git *: ask
  mcp:
    chrome_devtools_*: deny
    exa_*: allow
  skills:
    "*": ask
---

MCP behavior: permission.tools.mcp is the coarse entry/fallback permission for a registered mcp tool when one is available. More specific permission.mcp target rules override that fallback when they match.

Limitations: The frontmatter parser is intentionally minimal. Use only key: value scalars and nested maps. Avoid arrays, multi-line scalars, and YAML anchors.

Project-Level Config and Overrides

Project-local config uses the same format as the global config file. Per-agent overrides use YAML frontmatter in the project agents directory:

Scope	Path
Project config	<cwd>/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json
Project agent override	<cwd>/.pi/agent/agents/<agent>.md

These project files are resolved from Pi's current session cwd, so they are workspace-specific and do not move under PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR.

Precedence order:

1. Global config file
2. Project config file
3. Global agent frontmatter
4. Project agent frontmatter

Later layers override earlier layers within the same permission category. For wildcard-based sections like bash, mcp, skills, and special, matching still follows the extension's existing last matching rule wins behavior after the layers are combined. The recommended convention — also used by OpenCode's permission model — is to put the broad catch-all rule first and specific overrides after it.

---

Policy Reference

defaultPolicy

Sets fallback permissions when no specific rule matches:

{
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "ask",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask",
  },
}

tools

Controls tools by exact registered name (no wildcards). This is the recommended standalone format for all tool entries, including Pi built-ins and arbitrary third-party extension tools.

Tool name example	Description
bash	Shell command execution (tool-level fallback before bash pattern rules)
read / write	Canonical Pi built-in file tools
mcp	Registered MCP proxy tool entry/fallback when available
task	Delegation tool handled like any other registered extension tool
third_party_tool	Arbitrary registered extension tool

{
  "tools": {
    "read": "allow",
    "write": "deny",
    "mcp": "allow",
    "third_party_tool": "ask",
  },
}

Unknown or absent tools are not required in the config. If another extension is not installed, its tool simply will not be registered at runtime, and this extension will block attempts to call that missing tool before permission checks run.

Note: Setting tools.bash affects the default for bash commands, but bash patterns can provide command-level overrides.

Note: Setting tools.mcp controls coarse access to a registered mcp tool when one is available. Specific mcp rules still override it when a target pattern matches.

Note: Top-level shorthand is only supported for the canonical Pi built-ins (bash, read, write, edit, grep, find, ls) in agent frontmatter. Use permission.tools.<name> for mcp, task, and any third-party tool.

bash

Command patterns use * wildcards and match against the full command string. If multiple patterns match, the last matching rule wins, so put broad fallback rules first and specific overrides after them.

{
  "bash": {
    "git *": "ask",
    "git status": "allow",
    "rm -rf *": "deny",
  },
}

mcp

MCP permissions match against derived targets from tool input. These rules are more specific than tools.mcp and override that fallback when a pattern matches:

Target Type	Examples
Baseline ops	mcp_status, mcp_list, mcp_search, mcp_describe, mcp_connect
Server name	myServer
Server/tool combo	myServer:search, myServer_search
Generic	mcp_call

{
  "mcp": {
    "mcp_status": "allow",
    "mcp_list": "allow",
    "myServer:*": "ask",
    "dangerousServer": "deny",
  },
}

Note: Baseline discovery targets may auto-allow when you permit any MCP rule.

MCP Tool Fallback via tools.mcp

A registered mcp tool can use tools.mcp as an entry permission point. This provides a fallback when no specific MCP pattern matches:

{
  "tools": {
    "mcp": "allow",
  },
}

This is useful for per-agent configurations where you want to grant MCP access broadly:

# In the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/researcher.md; respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
---
name: researcher
permission:
  tools:
    mcp: allow
---

The permission resolution order for MCP operations:

1. Specific mcp patterns (e.g., myServer:toolName, myServer_*)
2. tools.mcp fallback (if set)
3. defaultPolicy.mcp

skills

Skill name patterns use * wildcards:

{
  "skills": {
    "*": "ask",
    "dangerous-*": "deny",
  },
}

special

Reserved permission checks:

Key	Description
doom_loop	Controls doom loop detection behavior
external_directory	Enforces ask/allow/deny decisions for path-bearing tools and bash commands that reference paths outside the active working directory

{
  "special": {
    "doom_loop": "deny",
    "external_directory": "ask",
  },
}

external_directory is evaluated before the normal tool permission check. For example, tools.read: "allow" can permit ordinary reads while special.external_directory: "ask" still requires confirmation before reading ../outside.txt or an absolute path outside ctx.cwd. Optional-path search tools (find, grep, ls) skip this check when no path is provided because they default to the active working directory.

Bash commands are also covered: the extension extracts path-like tokens from the command string and applies the same gate when any resolve outside ctx.cwd. Quoted strings are stripped first to reduce false positives (e.g., paths inside git commit -m "..." messages). This is a best-effort heuristic — variable expansion, subshells, and escaped quotes are not parsed. OS device paths (/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr) are always excluded from this check — they cannot hold or leak data and commonly appear in stderr-redirect idioms such as command 2>/dev/null.

---

Common Recipes

Read-Only Mode

{
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "ask",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask",
  },
  "tools": {
    "read": "allow",
    "grep": "allow",
    "find": "allow",
    "ls": "allow",
    "write": "deny",
    "edit": "deny",
  },
}

Restricted Bash Surface

{
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "deny",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask",
  },
  "bash": {
    "git *": "ask",
    "git status": "allow",
    "git diff": "allow",
    "git log *": "allow",
  },
}

MCP Discovery Only

{
  "defaultPolicy": {
    "tools": "ask",
    "bash": "ask",
    "mcp": "ask",
    "skills": "ask",
    "special": "ask",
  },
  "mcp": {
    "*": "ask",
    "mcp_status": "allow",
    "mcp_list": "allow",
    "mcp_search": "allow",
    "mcp_describe": "allow",
  },
}

Per-Agent Lockdown

In the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/reviewer.md, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):

---
permission:
  tools:
    write: deny
    edit: deny
  bash:
    "*": deny
---

---

Technical Details

Permission Prompt Summaries

When a tool permission resolves to ask, the prompt is designed to be readable enough for an informed approval decision:

• bash prompts show the command and matched bash pattern when available.
• mcp prompts show the derived MCP target and matched rule when available.
• Built-in file tools show concise summaries, such as the target path and edit/write line counts, instead of raw multiline JSON.
• Unknown or third-party extension tools show a bounded single-line JSON preview of the input so users are not asked to approve a blind tool name.

Example edit approval prompt:

Current agent requested tool 'edit' for '.gitignore' (1 replacement: edit #1 replaces 5 lines with 2 lines). Allow this call?

Subagent Permission Forwarding

When a delegated or routed subagent runs without direct UI access, ask permissions can still be enforced by forwarding the confirmation request through Pi session directories. The main interactive session polls for forwarded requests, shows the confirmation prompt, writes the response, and the subagent resumes once that decision is available.

This keeps ask policies usable even when the original permission check happens inside a non-UI execution context.

Logging

When the extension prompts, denies, or forwards permission requests, it can append structured JSONL entries under:

Default global logs directory: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs/
Actual global logs directory: $PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs/ when PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR is set

• pi-permission-system-permission-review.jsonl — enabled by default for permission review/audit history, including bounded toolInputPreview values for non-bash/non-MCP tool calls
• pi-permission-system-debug.jsonl — disabled by default and intended for troubleshooting

On every session start, the extension emits a config.resolved entry to both logs listing the resolved config paths and whether each exists. This makes it easy to verify which files the extension actually loaded:

{
  "event": "config.resolved",
  "globalConfigPath": "/…/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json",
  "globalConfigExists": true,
  "projectConfigPath": "/…/my-project/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json",
  "projectConfigExists": false,
  "agentsDir": "/…/.pi/agent/agents",
  "agentsDirExists": true,
  "projectAgentsDir": "/…/my-project/.pi/agent/agents",
  "projectAgentsDirExists": false,
  "legacyGlobalPolicyDetected": false,
  "legacyProjectPolicyDetected": false,
  "legacyExtensionConfigDetected": false
}

Architecture

index.ts                    → Root Pi entrypoint shim
src/
├── index.ts                → Extension bootstrap, permission checks, readable prompts, review logging, reload handling, and subagent forwarding
├── config-loader.ts        → Unified config loader, merger, and legacy-path detection
├── config-paths.ts         → Path derivation for global, project, and legacy config locations
├── config-reporter.ts      → Resolved config path reporting for diagnostic logs
├── extension-config.ts     → Runtime config normalization and defaults
├── logging.ts              → File-only debug/review logging helpers
├── permission-manager.ts   → Global/project policy loading, merging, and resolution with caching
├── skill-prompt-sanitizer.ts → Skill prompt parsing, multi-block sanitization, and skill-read path matching
├── bash-filter.ts          → Bash command wildcard pattern matching
├── wildcard-matcher.ts     → Shared wildcard pattern compilation and matching
├── common.ts               → Shared utilities (YAML parsing, type guards, etc.)
├── tool-registry.ts        → Registered tool name resolution
└── types.ts                → TypeScript type definitions
tests/
├── permission-system.test.ts → Core permission, layering, forwarding, and policy tests
├── config-modal.test.ts      → Config command and modal behavior tests
└── test-harness.ts           → Shared lightweight test helpers
schemas/
└── permissions.schema.json → JSON Schema for policy validation
config/
└── config.example.json     → Starter global policy template

Module Organization

The extension uses a modular architecture with shared utilities:

Module	Purpose
common.ts	Shared utilities: toRecord(), getNonEmptyString(), isPermissionState(), parseSimpleYamlMap(), extractFrontmatter()
wildcard-matcher.ts	Compile-once wildcard patterns with last-match-wins evaluation: compileWildcardPatterns(), findCompiledWildcardMatch()
permission-manager.ts	Policy resolution with file stamp caching for performance
bash-filter.ts	Uses shared wildcard matcher for bash command patterns
skill-prompt-sanitizer.ts	Parses all available skill prompt blocks, removes denied skills, and tracks visible skill paths for read protection

Performance Optimizations

• File stamp caching: Configurations are cached with file modification timestamps to avoid redundant reads
• Pre-compiled patterns: Wildcard patterns are compiled to regex once and reused across permission checks
• Resolved permissions caching: Merged agent+global permissions are cached per-agent with invalidation on file changes

Threat Model

Goal: Enforce policy at the host level, not the model level.

What this stops:

• Agent calling tools it shouldn't use (e.g., write, dangerous bash)
• Tool switching attempts (calling non-existent tool names)
• Accidental escalation via skill loading
• Unapproved path-bearing tool access outside the active working directory when external_directory is ask or deny

Limitations:

• If a dangerous action is possible via an allowed tool, policy must explicitly restrict it
• This is a permission decision layer, not a sandbox

Schema Validation

Validate your config against the included schema:

npx --yes ajv-cli@5 validate \
  -s ./schemas/permissions.schema.json \
  -d ./pi-permissions.valid.json

Editor tip: Add "$schema": "./schemas/permissions.schema.json" to your config for autocomplete support.

---

Migration from pre-v2 layout

Before v2, config was split across two files:

• Policy: ~/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc
• Runtime knobs: <extension-install-dir>/config.json

These are now consolidated into one file. The extension detects legacy files and merges them with a warning for one release. To migrate manually:

# Move the global policy file
mkdir -p ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system
mv ~/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json

# If you had project-level policy:
mkdir -p .pi/extensions/pi-permission-system
mv .pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc .pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json

Then add any runtime knobs (debugLog, permissionReviewLog, yoloMode) to the same file. The old extension-root config.json is no longer read from the install directory.

Note: Logs also moved from <extension-install-dir>/logs/ to ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs/. Old log files are not deleted or migrated — they remain readable but no new entries are appended.

---

Troubleshooting

Problem	Cause	Solution
Config not applied (everything asks)	File not found or parse error	Verify the global config at ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json (respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR); check for trailing commas
Per-agent override not applied	Frontmatter parsing issue	Ensure --- delimiters at file top; keep YAML simple; restart session
Tool blocked as unregistered	Unknown tool name	Use a registered mcp tool for server tools: { "tool": "server:tool" }
/skill:<name> blocked	Deny policy or confirmation unavailable	Check merged skills policy (global/project/agent layers). Active agent context is optional in the main session; ask still requires UI or forwarded confirmation.
External file path blocked	special.external_directory is ask without UI or deny	Allow/ask the special permission or keep file tools inside the active working directory.
Permission prompt is too verbose	Generic extension tool input is large	Built-in file tools are summarized automatically; third-party tools are capped to a bounded one-line JSON preview.

---

Development

pnpm run build       # Type-check TypeScript (no emit)
pnpm run lint        # Biome lint + format check
pnpm run lint:fix    # Biome lint + format auto-fix
pnpm run lint:md     # markdownlint-cli2 on README etc.
pnpm run lint:all    # lint + lint:md
pnpm run format      # Biome format --write
pnpm run test        # Run tests from ./tests
pnpm run check       # build + lint:all + test

Pre-commit hooks

This project uses prek to run Biome and markdownlint on staged files before each commit. This catches lint and formatting issues locally instead of waiting for CI.

1. Install prek (installation guide).
2. Run pnpm install — the prepare script calls prek install automatically. If prek is not installed, the script prints a warning and continues.
3. Hooks run automatically on git commit. To skip in emergencies: git commit --no-verify.

The hook configuration lives in prek.toml at the repo root.

---

Related Pi Extensions

• pi-multi-auth — Multi-provider credential management and quota-aware rotation
• pi-tool-display — Compact tool rendering and diff visualization
• pi-rtk-optimizer — RTK command rewriting and output compaction
• pi-MUST-have-extension — RFC 2119 keyword normalization for prompts

License

MIT