pi-anti-doom-loop
Detect and break agent doom loops in pi: blocks identical repeated tool calls and blind retries before they burn tokens.
Package details
Install pi-anti-doom-loop from npm and Pi will load the resources declared by the package manifest.
$ pi install npm:pi-anti-doom-loop- Package
pi-anti-doom-loop- Version
0.0.16- Published
- Nov 7, 2026
- Downloads
- 500/mo · 287/wk
- Author
- irfndi
- License
- MIT
- Types
- extension
- Size
- 135 KB
- Dependencies
- 3 dependencies · 1 peer
Pi manifest JSON
{
"extensions": [
"./extensions"
]
}Security note
Pi packages can execute code and influence agent behavior. Review the source before installing third-party packages.
README
pi-anti-doom-loop
Stop agent doom loops in pi before they burn tokens.
Cheap models sometimes get stuck repeating the same cheap tool call — grep
the same file, re-run the same failing command — with no progress. Each
iteration is so cheap nobody notices until the bill mounts. This extension
watches every tool call and blocks the loop at the source.
Install
pi install npm:pi-anti-doom-loop
What it detects
| Signal | Default | Blocked when |
|---|---|---|
Same (tool, args) repeated |
3× in the last 10 calls | The pattern has repeated 3 times with no change |
| Same tool failing consecutively | 3× | A tool errored 3 times in a row — stop retrying it blindly. The next call is allowed through |
| Same assistant text verbatim | 3× within the last N messages | The model re-emitted identical text 3 times inside the sliding window |
| Same sentence inside ONE message | 3× | A sentence repeats 3+ times within a single message (growing self-concatenation loops) |
| Near-identical text (rephrasing) | 3× in a row | Consecutive messages share ≥55% tokens — the model is rephrasing the same step |
| Near-identical text cycle (rotating rephrased commands) | 3× within the last N messages | Near-identical assistant texts (≥55% token similarity) accumulate to the repeat threshold in the window, even when not identical and not consecutive |
Blocks hand the model an instructive reason ("change your approach, use a different tool, or ask the user"). If the model ignores the block and re-issues the exact same call, the turn is aborted.
Escalation (text loops): steer → abort → bounded resume
The first text-loop detection steers the agent mid-run (injects guidance, lets it continue). If it persists, the run is aborted and one fresh- resume directive is queued so work continues with a new approach. If it still loops after that, the run aborts for real and control returns to you — the auto-resume budget is capped per session (a new prompt does not restore it) so a truly stuck model can't cycle forever. Detection counters reset on every user prompt, so a task legitimately repeated later in the same session is never a false positive.
Every state machine behind this behaviour — states, invariants, and the
transitions the code allows — is documented in
docs/state-machines.md.
Configuration
Environment variables, read at session/prompt start:
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
PI_ANTI_LOOP_REPEATS |
3 |
Identical-call block threshold |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_FAILS |
3 |
Consecutive-failure block threshold |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_TEXT_REPEATS |
3 |
Window/cycle repeat threshold for identical and near-identical assistant texts |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_WINDOW |
10 |
How many recent calls/results are inspected (raised if a threshold needs more) |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_TIME_WINDOW |
0 |
Elapsed-time window in ms (0 = disabled, count-only): evicts window entries older than this so slow chronic loops over a long session are caught |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_FAIL_RATE |
0 |
Fail-rate block threshold 0..1 (0 = disabled): block when a tool's error share of its in-window calls reaches this |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_FAIL_RATE_MIN |
3 |
Minimum calls before the fail-rate window can block |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_TOOLS_EXCLUDE |
— | Comma-separated tool names to disable detection for entirely (never block, never enter the window — applies to nested codemode calls too) |
PI_ANTI_LOOP_DISABLE |
— | Set to 1 to disable the extension entirely; read per prompt, not only at load |
When the agent needs to repeat anyway
Some repeats are correct. Polling a job, waiting on a deploy to go green, or re-running one flaky step all mean calling the same thing again — and the reason lives in the agent's head, not in the arguments. Blocking those just forces a workaround.
So a repeat block is overridable by the agent itself, through a loop_ack
tool registered by this extension:
- A repeat block names it, in the block reason: "If this repeat is intentional … call loop_ack and say why."
- The agent calls
loop_ackwith the reason. - The call it just got blocked on is cleared from the window — and so is the
whole near-identical cluster behind the block, so a retry whose args drifted
(the
head, asleepwrapper) is not instantly re-blocked — and the retry runs.
It acts on the last block, so the agent never re-sends the arguments — the detector already has them.
It is deliberately narrow:
- Only repeat blocks. A block caused by repeated failures cannot be acknowledged. There the evidence is already in the transcript, and waving it through would remove the guard that stops blind retries.
- Not a repeat that is also failing. If the tool has failed since its last success, the block is a blind retry, and the hint is not offered at all. An acknowledgement never erases failure evidence, so a command that starts failing re-blocks.
- Bounded per tool. One tool can be acknowledged twice per prompt, not more — otherwise "ack, retry, blocked, ack" becomes the loop it was meant to allow. Scoped to the tool rather than the exact call, because a drifting loop changes its arguments on every retry and would otherwise get a fresh allowance each time.
- Reset with everything else on the next user prompt.
Prefer this over the disable switches when only one call is in question.
Turning it off
Loosest to strictest — pick the scope you need:
| Scope | How | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| One blocked repeat | the agent calls loop_ack with a reason (see above) |
that signature is cleared and the retry allowed |
| This session | /loopcheck suspend |
off until the next prompt |
| Global | "antiDoomLoop": { "enabled": false } in ~/.pi/agent/settings.json |
off in every project |
| This project | "antiDoomLoop": { "enabled": false } in <repo>/.pi/settings.json |
off in this project only; needs project trust |
| Everywhere, incl. automation | PI_ANTI_LOOP_DISABLE=1 |
off, for CI and scripts |
Pi deep-merges the two settings.json files with the project winning per key,
so a project can disable what global enables (and vice versa) without either
file repeating the other. Only an explicit false disables: a missing key, a
malformed value, or a non-boolean leaves detection on, because a typo must
never silently turn off loop detection. The project scope only applies to a
trusted project — pi does not read .pi/settings.json otherwise.
Edit either file during a session and the change lands on the next prompt; no restart needed.
Command
/loopcheck— show thresholds, counters (steers/aborts this session), suspend state, the current window contents (most-repeated recent calls and texts), repeated-argument token count, and the fail-rate/time-window/exclude config when enabled/loopcheck reset— clear counters/loopcheck suspend— pause detection until the next prompt (escape hatch for intentional repetition)/loopcheck resume— re-enable detection early
Codemode (pi ≥ 0.99): nested script calls
pi's codemode tool lets the model run a JavaScript script that calls other
tools via tools.<name>(args) — a script can loop hundreds of calls inside
ONE top-level tool call, which per-call detection never sees as a streak.
Since pi 0.99, those nested calls still flow through the tool_call/
tool_result events tagged with parentToolCallId — and this extension
tracks them:
- Stricter in-script threshold — inside one script, the 2nd identical call blocks (top-level detection needs 3). A repeated call inside a script is never progress: the script can store its first result in a variable and reuse it. Near-identical args (sleep-wrapped polls, flag drift) count too.
- Error-retry rule — an identical retry of a call that already errored inside the same script blocks immediately with a "the identical call already failed inside this script" reason.
- Script-level isolation — nested traffic never enters the top-level window and vice versa, so script loops cannot hide from their own 2× rule and legitimate top-level repetition is never inflated by scripts.
- The information wall — a nested block reason reaches the script as a tool error, not the model (only the script's return value does). When a script swallows it anyway, the next assistant message gets a one-shot steer telling the model to call each tool once and reuse results — so the loop signal can never be silently eaten by a script that ignores tool errors.
- Cross-script escalation — counters are per-script (a new script starts clean), but re-issuing a signature blocked in an earlier script this prompt escalates and aborts the turn, mirroring top-level block-escalation.
Huge nested payloads (whole-file reads) are identity-capped (100 KB per call)
and each script keeps only its most recent 100 calls, so memory stays bounded. /loopcheck reports nested: calls=N blocks=M.
Scripts are exempt from the top-level near-identical rule. Two different
scripts share JS boilerplate (const, await, tools, return), so their
shared-token score is ~0.7 — above the 0.55 near-identical bar. Sequential
one-off scripts checking different hypotheses are normal exploration, not a
loop, and the near-identical rule blocked them. They are therefore compared by
exact identity only (the same script re-issued still blocks), while their real
loop shape — repeated calls inside one script — stays covered by the nested
2× rule above. If a specific call is a deliberate repeat, the agent can clear it
with loop_ack.
Token-cost awareness
The detector estimates the size of repeated argument text (~4 chars/token) and
reports it as "~N tokens of repeated arguments." in tool-call block reasons.
The cumulative count also appears in /loopcheck status.
It is deliberately not labelled "wasted": for an exploratory session, a repeat can be the productive move, and only the caller knows which. The figure sizes the repetition; it does not judge it.
How it works
Everything hooks into the tool_call / tool_result / message_end events;
detection is a small sliding-window counter (see extensions/detector.ts) with
per-session counters (steers/aborts) tracked in extensions/controller.ts.
Works with any model — cheap models just trigger it more often.
Development
Requires Node 22.18+ and pnpm 12 (pinned via packageManager; the install uses pnpm's virtual store at node_modules/.pnpm).
pnpm install
pnpm test # node --test: unit + fixture + fuzz + integration + e2e (incl. real-pi e2e)
pnpm run check # pnpm test + tsc + oxlint --deny-warnings + oxfmt
E2E against real pi ≥ 0.99
tests/e2e/pi.test.ts downloads the real @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent@0.99.2
once (cached in the OS temp dir), then drives it headlessly: an in-process
OpenAI-compatible fake LLM scripts the assistant turns, pi's RPC entry runs
with THIS repo's extension loaded, and the assertions read the real RPC event
stream. Verified scenarios:
- the extension loads into pi 0.99 and blocks a scripted identical-
bashdoom loop with the instructive block reason - a real codemode worker executing a script that polls a file 5× inside
ONE
codemodecall gets blocked by the nested 2× rule — the script fails withBLOCKED by anti-doom-loop — inside one codemode script… - the recommended distinct
Promise.allSettledbatch completes untouched
Everything is offline (no API keys); if the npm registry is unreachable the real-pi tests skip cleanly instead of failing. Run just them with:
pnpm run e2e:pi
Test suite (Node built-in runner, no framework)
| Suite | File | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
| unit | tests/unit.test.ts |
detector semantics: repeat/failure/text/nested signals, window eviction, options clamping, helpers |
| fixture | tests/fixtures.ts + tests/fixture.test.ts |
real doom-loop transcripts (CI-log loops, verbatim repeats, codemode script loops) are caught; healthy sessions are not |
| fuzz | tests/fuzz.test.ts |
seeded random streams: never throws, no false positives, injected loops always block, canonical stability |
| integration | tests/integration.test.ts |
controller + index.ts adapter driven through a fake PiLike: blocks, escalations, aborts, resets, /loopcheck |
| e2e | tests/e2e.test.ts + tests/e2e/pi.test.ts |
real subprocesses: detector self-check, version guard, tarball contents (extensions/scripts ship, tests don't), and full sessions against a real pi ≥ 0.99 with a scripted fake LLM |
peerDependenciespins@earendil-works/pi-coding-agentat"*"on purpose — the pi packages docs require an unbounded range for pi-core packages (pi provides them at runtime). The extension loads.tsdirectly via jiti, so no build step ships;prepublishOnlyruns the full quality gate before publish. When a call is blocked, escalation still works without recording it in the window: re-issuing the identical call increments a per-signature block counter and aborts the turn on the second block. Thresholds are clamped to a minimum of 2 so a bad config can never brick the agent.
Releasing
Publishing is handled by the GitHub Actions workflow .github/workflows/release.yml, guarded against version drift:
- Add an npm Automation token as the
NPM_TOKENrepo secret (Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions, orgh secret set NPM_TOKEN). - Bump
versioninpackage.json, commit, then tag and push:
git tag v0.0.1
git push origin v0.0.1
CI runs the quality gate with pnpm, then the version bump guard (pnpm run guard): it blocks publishing if the version is already on npm or the tag doesn't match package.json. After publishing, the workflow polls the registry until the new version is actually installable — npm scans new publishes before serving them, so publish succeeding is not the same as install working. After the first publish, the pi.dev gallery picks the package up automatically via the pi-package keyword.
License
MIT