pi-permission-system
Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent.
Package details
Install pi-permission-system from npm and Pi will load the resources declared by the package manifest.
$ pi install npm:pi-permission-system- Package
pi-permission-system- Version
0.4.6- Published
- Apr 28, 2026
- Downloads
- 1,233/mo · 594/wk
- Author
- masurii
- License
- MIT
- Types
- extension
- Size
- 273.6 KB
- Dependencies
- 0 dependencies · 4 peers
Pi manifest JSON
{
"extensions": [
"./index.ts"
]
}Security note
Pi packages can execute code and influence agent behavior. Review the source before installing third-party packages.
README
🔐 pi-permission-system
Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent that provides centralized, deterministic permission gates for tool, bash, MCP, skill, and special operations.
Features
- Tool Filtering — Hides disallowed tools from the agent before it starts (reduces "try another tool" behavior)
- System Prompt Sanitization — Removes denied tool entries from the
Available tools:system prompt section so the agent only sees tools it can actually call - Runtime Enforcement — Blocks/asks/allows at tool call time with UI confirmation dialogs and readable approval summaries
- Bash Command Control — Wildcard pattern matching for granular bash command permissions
- MCP Access Control — Server and tool-level permissions for MCP operations
- Skill Protection — Controls which skills can be loaded or read from disk, including multi-block prompt sanitization
- Per-Agent Overrides — Agent-specific permission policies via YAML frontmatter
- Subagent Permission Forwarding — Forwards
askconfirmations from non-UI subagents back to the main interactive session - File-Based Review Logging — Writes permission request/denial review entries to a file by default for later auditing
- Optional Debug Logging — Keeps verbose extension diagnostics in a separate file when enabled in
config.json - JSON Schema Validation — Full schema for editor autocomplete and config validation
- External Directory Guard — Enforces
special.external_directoryfor path-bearing file tools that target paths outside the active working directory
Installation
npm package
pi install npm:pi-permission-system
Local extension folder
Place this folder in one of the following locations:
| Scope | Path |
|---|---|
| Global default | ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system (respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR) |
| Project | .pi/extensions/pi-permission-system |
Pi auto-discovers extensions in these paths.
Tip: All
~/.pi/agentpaths shown in this document are defaults. If thePI_CODING_AGENT_DIRenvironment variable is set, pi uses that directory instead. The extension automatically follows pi'sgetAgentDir()helper, so global policy files, per-agent overrides, session directories, and extension installation paths all resolve under the configured agent directory.
Usage
Quick Start
- Create the global policy file at the Pi agent runtime root (default:
~/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc, respectsPI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):
{
"defaultPolicy": {
"tools": "ask",
"bash": "ask",
"mcp": "ask",
"skills": "ask",
"special": "ask"
},
"tools": {
"read": "allow",
"write": "deny"
}
}
- Start Pi — the extension automatically loads and enforces your policy.
Permission States
All permissions use one of three states:
| State | Behavior |
|---|---|
allow |
Permits the action silently |
deny |
Blocks the action with an error message |
ask |
Prompts the user for confirmation via UI |
Pi Integration Hooks
The extension integrates via Pi's lifecycle hooks:
| Hook | Behavior |
|---|---|
before_agent_start |
Filters active tools, removes denied tool entries from the system prompt, and hides denied skills |
tool_call |
Enforces permissions for every tool invocation |
input |
Intercepts /skill:<name> requests and enforces skill policy |
Additional behaviors:
- Unknown/unregistered tools are blocked before permission checks (prevents bypass attempts)
- The
Available tools:system prompt section is rewritten to match the filtered active tool set - Extension-provided tools like
task,mcp, and third-party tools are handled by exact registered name instead of private built-in hardcodes - When a subagent hits an
askpermission without direct UI access, the request can be forwarded to the main interactive session for confirmation - Generic extension-tool approval prompts include a bounded input preview; built-in file tools use concise human-readable summaries instead of raw multiline JSON
- Permission review logs include bounded
toolInputPreviewvalues for non-bash/non-MCP tool calls so approvals can be audited without writing raw full payloads - Path-bearing file tools (
read,write,edit,find,grep,ls) evaluatespecial.external_directorybefore their normal tool permission when an explicit path points outsidectx.cwd
Configuration
Extension Config File
Location: global Pi extension config (default: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
The extension creates this file automatically when it is missing. It controls only extension-local logging behavior:
{
"debugLog": false,
"permissionReviewLog": true,
"yoloMode": false
}
| Key | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
debugLog |
false |
Enables verbose diagnostic logging to logs/pi-permission-system-debug.jsonl |
permissionReviewLog |
true |
Enables the permission request/denial review log at logs/pi-permission-system-permission-review.jsonl |
yoloMode |
false |
Auto-approves ask results instead of prompting when yolo mode is enabled |
Both logs write to files only under the extension directory. No debug output is printed to the terminal.
Global Policy File
Location: global Pi policy file (default: ~/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
The policy file is a JSON object with these sections:
| Section | Description |
|---|---|
defaultPolicy |
Fallback permissions per category |
tools |
Exact-name tool permissions for registered tools |
bash |
Command pattern permissions |
mcp |
MCP server/tool permissions for calls routed through a registered mcp tool |
skills |
Skill name pattern permissions |
special |
Reserved permission checks such as external directory access |
Note: Trailing commas are not supported. If parsing fails, the extension falls back to
askfor all categories.
Global Per-Agent Overrides
Override global permissions for specific agents via YAML frontmatter in the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/<agent>.md, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):
---
name: my-agent
permission:
tools:
read: allow
write: deny
mcp: allow
bash:
git status: allow
git *: ask
mcp:
chrome_devtools_*: deny
exa_*: allow
skills:
"*": ask
---
MCP behavior: permission.tools.mcp is the coarse entry/fallback permission for a registered mcp tool when one is available. More specific permission.mcp target rules override that fallback when they match.
Limitations: The frontmatter parser is intentionally minimal. Use only key: value scalars and nested maps. Avoid arrays, multi-line scalars, and YAML anchors.
Project-Level Policy Files
The extension can also layer project-local permission files relative to the active session working directory:
| Scope | Path |
|---|---|
| Project policy | <cwd>/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc |
| Project agent override | <cwd>/.pi/agent/agents/<agent>.md |
Project-local files use the same formats as the global policy file and global agent frontmatter. These project files are resolved from Pi's current session cwd, so they are workspace-specific and do not move under PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR.
Precedence order:
- Global policy file
- Project policy file
- Global agent frontmatter
- Project agent frontmatter
Later layers override earlier layers within the same permission category. For wildcard-based sections like bash, mcp, skills, and special, matching still follows the extension's existing last matching rule wins behavior after the layers are combined.
Policy Reference
defaultPolicy
Sets fallback permissions when no specific rule matches:
{
"defaultPolicy": {
"tools": "ask",
"bash": "ask",
"mcp": "ask",
"skills": "ask",
"special": "ask"
}
}
tools
Controls tools by exact registered name (no wildcards). This is the recommended standalone format for all tool entries, including Pi built-ins and arbitrary third-party extension tools.
| Tool name example | Description |
|---|---|
bash |
Shell command execution (tool-level fallback before bash pattern rules) |
read / write |
Canonical Pi built-in file tools |
mcp |
Registered MCP proxy tool entry/fallback when available |
task |
Delegation tool handled like any other registered extension tool |
third_party_tool |
Arbitrary registered extension tool |
{
"tools": {
"read": "allow",
"write": "deny",
"mcp": "allow",
"third_party_tool": "ask"
}
}
Unknown or absent tools are not required in the config. If another extension is not installed, its tool simply will not be registered at runtime, and this extension will block attempts to call that missing tool before permission checks run.
Note: Setting
tools.bashaffects the default for bash commands, butbashpatterns can provide command-level overrides.Note: Setting
tools.mcpcontrols coarse access to a registeredmcptool when one is available. Specificmcprules still override it when a target pattern matches.Note: Top-level shorthand is only supported for the canonical Pi built-ins (
bash,read,write,edit,grep,find,ls) in agent frontmatter. Usepermission.tools.<name>formcp,task, and any third-party tool.
bash
Command patterns use * wildcards and match against the full command string. If multiple patterns match, the last matching rule wins.
{
"bash": {
"git *": "ask",
"git status": "allow",
"rm -rf *": "deny"
}
}
mcp
MCP permissions match against derived targets from tool input. These rules are more specific than tools.mcp and override that fallback when a pattern matches:
| Target Type | Examples |
|---|---|
| Baseline ops | mcp_status, mcp_list, mcp_search, mcp_describe, mcp_connect |
| Server name | myServer |
| Server/tool combo | myServer:search, myServer_search |
| Generic | mcp_call |
{
"mcp": {
"mcp_status": "allow",
"mcp_list": "allow",
"myServer:*": "ask",
"dangerousServer": "deny"
}
}
Note: Baseline discovery targets may auto-allow when you permit any MCP rule.
MCP Tool Fallback via tools.mcp
A registered mcp tool can use tools.mcp as an entry permission point. This provides a fallback when no specific MCP pattern matches:
{
"tools": {
"mcp": "allow"
}
}
This is useful for per-agent configurations where you want to grant MCP access broadly:
# In the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/researcher.md; respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
---
name: researcher
permission:
tools:
mcp: allow
---
The permission resolution order for MCP operations:
- Specific
mcppatterns (e.g.,myServer:toolName,myServer_*) tools.mcpfallback (if set)defaultPolicy.mcp
skills
Skill name patterns use * wildcards:
{
"skills": {
"*": "ask",
"dangerous-*": "deny"
}
}
special
Reserved permission checks:
| Key | Description |
|---|---|
doom_loop |
Controls doom loop detection behavior |
external_directory |
Enforces ask/allow/deny decisions for path-bearing built-in tools (read, write, edit, find, grep, ls) when they target paths outside the active working directory |
tool_call_limit |
(schema only, not enforced yet) |
{
"special": {
"doom_loop": "deny",
"external_directory": "ask"
}
}
external_directory is evaluated before the normal tool permission check. For example, tools.read: "allow" can permit ordinary reads while special.external_directory: "ask" still requires confirmation before reading ../outside.txt or an absolute path outside ctx.cwd. Optional-path search tools (find, grep, ls) skip this check when no path is provided because they default to the active working directory.
Common Recipes
Read-Only Mode
{
"defaultPolicy": { "tools": "ask", "bash": "ask", "mcp": "ask", "skills": "ask", "special": "ask" },
"tools": {
"read": "allow",
"grep": "allow",
"find": "allow",
"ls": "allow",
"write": "deny",
"edit": "deny"
}
}
Restricted Bash Surface
{
"defaultPolicy": { "tools": "ask", "bash": "deny", "mcp": "ask", "skills": "ask", "special": "ask" },
"bash": {
"git status": "allow",
"git diff": "allow",
"git log *": "allow",
"git *": "ask"
}
}
MCP Discovery Only
{
"defaultPolicy": { "tools": "ask", "bash": "ask", "mcp": "ask", "skills": "ask", "special": "ask" },
"mcp": {
"mcp_status": "allow",
"mcp_list": "allow",
"mcp_search": "allow",
"mcp_describe": "allow",
"*": "ask"
}
}
Per-Agent Lockdown
In the global Pi agents directory (default: ~/.pi/agent/agents/reviewer.md, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR):
---
permission:
tools:
write: deny
edit: deny
bash:
"*": deny
---
Technical Details
Permission Prompt Summaries
When a tool permission resolves to ask, the prompt is designed to be readable enough for an informed approval decision:
bashprompts show the command and matched bash pattern when available.mcpprompts show the derived MCP target and matched rule when available.- Built-in file tools show concise summaries, such as the target path and edit/write line counts, instead of raw multiline JSON.
- Unknown or third-party extension tools show a bounded single-line JSON preview of the input so users are not asked to approve a blind tool name.
Example edit approval prompt:
Current agent requested tool 'edit' for '.gitignore' (1 replacement: edit #1 replaces 5 lines with 2 lines). Allow this call?
Subagent Permission Forwarding
When a delegated or routed subagent runs without direct UI access, ask permissions can still be enforced by forwarding the confirmation request through Pi session directories. The main interactive session polls for forwarded requests, shows the confirmation prompt, writes the response, and the subagent resumes once that decision is available.
This keeps ask policies usable even when the original permission check happens inside a non-UI execution context.
Logging
When the extension prompts, denies, or forwards permission requests, it can append structured JSONL entries under:
Default global logs directory: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs/
Actual global logs directory: $PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR/extensions/pi-permission-system/logs when PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR is set
pi-permission-system-permission-review.jsonl— enabled by default for permission review/audit history, including boundedtoolInputPreviewvalues for non-bash/non-MCP tool callspi-permission-system-debug.jsonl— disabled by default and intended for troubleshooting
Architecture
index.ts → Root Pi entrypoint shim
src/
├── index.ts → Extension bootstrap, permission checks, readable prompts, review logging, reload handling, and subagent forwarding
├── extension-config.ts → Extension-local config loading and default creation
├── logging.ts → File-only debug/review logging helpers
├── permission-manager.ts → Global/project policy loading, merging, and resolution with caching
├── skill-prompt-sanitizer.ts → Skill prompt parsing, multi-block sanitization, and skill-read path matching
├── bash-filter.ts → Bash command wildcard pattern matching
├── wildcard-matcher.ts → Shared wildcard pattern compilation and matching
├── common.ts → Shared utilities (YAML parsing, type guards, etc.)
├── tool-registry.ts → Registered tool name resolution
└── types.ts → TypeScript type definitions
tests/
├── permission-system.test.ts → Core permission, layering, forwarding, and policy tests
├── config-modal.test.ts → Config command and modal behavior tests
└── test-harness.ts → Shared lightweight test helpers
schemas/
└── permissions.schema.json → JSON Schema for policy validation
config/
└── config.example.json → Starter global policy template
Module Organization
The extension uses a modular architecture with shared utilities:
| Module | Purpose |
|---|---|
common.ts |
Shared utilities: toRecord(), getNonEmptyString(), isPermissionState(), parseSimpleYamlMap(), extractFrontmatter() |
wildcard-matcher.ts |
Compile-once wildcard patterns with specificity sorting: compileWildcardPatterns(), findCompiledWildcardMatch() |
permission-manager.ts |
Policy resolution with file stamp caching for performance |
bash-filter.ts |
Uses shared wildcard matcher for bash command patterns |
skill-prompt-sanitizer.ts |
Parses all available skill prompt blocks, removes denied skills, and tracks visible skill paths for read protection |
Performance Optimizations
- File stamp caching: Configurations are cached with file modification timestamps to avoid redundant reads
- Pre-compiled patterns: Wildcard patterns are compiled to regex once and reused across permission checks
- Resolved permissions caching: Merged agent+global permissions are cached per-agent with invalidation on file changes
Threat Model
Goal: Enforce policy at the host level, not the model level.
What this stops:
- Agent calling tools it shouldn't use (e.g.,
write, dangerousbash) - Tool switching attempts (calling non-existent tool names)
- Accidental escalation via skill loading
- Unapproved path-bearing tool access outside the active working directory when
external_directoryisaskordeny
Limitations:
- If a dangerous action is possible via an allowed tool, policy must explicitly restrict it
- This is a permission decision layer, not a sandbox
Schema Validation
Validate your config against the included schema:
npx --yes ajv-cli@5 validate \
-s ./schemas/permissions.schema.json \
-d ./pi-permissions.valid.json
Editor tip: Add "$schema": "./schemas/permissions.schema.json" to your config for autocomplete support.
Troubleshooting
| Problem | Cause | Solution |
|---|---|---|
| Config not applied (everything asks) | File not found or parse error | Verify the global Pi policy file (default: ~/.pi/agent/pi-permissions.jsonc, respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR); check for trailing commas |
| Per-agent override not applied | Frontmatter parsing issue | Ensure --- delimiters at file top; keep YAML simple; restart session |
| Tool blocked as unregistered | Unknown tool name | Use a registered mcp tool for server tools: { "tool": "server:tool" } |
/skill:<name> blocked |
Deny policy or confirmation unavailable | Check merged skills policy (global/project/agent layers). Active agent context is optional in the main session; ask still requires UI or forwarded confirmation. |
| External file path blocked | special.external_directory is ask without UI or deny |
Allow/ask the special permission or keep file tools inside the active working directory. |
| Permission prompt is too verbose | Generic extension tool input is large | Built-in file tools are summarized automatically; third-party tools are capped to a bounded one-line JSON preview. |
Development
npm run build # Compile TypeScript
npm run lint # Run linter (uses build)
npm run test # Run tests from ./tests
npm run check # Run lint + test
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- pi-MUST-have-extension — RFC 2119 keyword normalization for prompts